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1. Origins 
 
It is widely recognised that monetary paper instruments appeared in China earlier than in the 
West, paper itself having been invented there during the Han era. However, there have been 
to date few direct scholarly attempts to place the early-modern Western and pre-modern 
Chinese formative experiences with paper money in detailed comparison by way of attaining 
a better understanding of the evolution of money as a whole.   
 
Some of the earliest precursors of banking and fiduciary currency in China date back to the 
heyday of the Tang dynasty (617-907 BC). A case in point is the appearance of guifang 櫃坊 
or ‘counting houses’ where, for a small service charge, merchants could deposit liquid funds 
in order to protect them from fire or theft, and draft checks to a third party against the 
deposits whenever necessary. The proprietors of these early financial institutions are believed 
to have devised call loan schemes resourced on their clients’ deposits in order to increase 
house turnover. By the early 10
th
 century, however, the guifang had allegedly become 
associated with dubious speculators, who habitually debased coins deposits for quick gains, 
or turned the establishments they owned into gambling dens.
1
  
 
Guifang was concurrent with another notable Tang monetary innovation – ‘flying cash’ 
(feiqian 飛錢) – that was introduced during emperor Xianzong’s (憲宗 r. 806-820 AD) reign. 
                                                 
1 Twitchett (1970), pp. 73-74. 
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Flying cash entailed a public-order mechanism whereby merchants received paper scrip from 
the imperial treasury against liquid deposits, which could be easily carried onto other 
provinces and cashed there in tax depots as need be. Guifang and flying cash depots dotted 
the Tang capital of Chang’an and other urban centres. They became the most visible sign of 
an increasingly sophisticated credit economy. But while private-order counting houses were 
gradually falling from grace, variants of flying cash continued to be used throughout the 
subsequent Five Dynasties era (907-960), laying the groundwork for the dissemination of the 
world’s first full-fledged fiduciary paper money during the Northern Song (960-1127 AD). 2   
 
2. The ‘Song Industrial Revolution’ 
 
The concept of fiduciary money in China drew on the first monetary uses of paper scrip 
during the later part of the Tang, as well as from the variegated occurrence of base metals in 
interregional trade after the collapse of the Tang and the ensuing political disunion of the 
Five Dynasties (CE 907-960). That period saw extensive internecine warfare, which brought 
copper mining to near standstill in the north. Because copper was becoming rarer, almost all 
of the contending overlords at the time attempted to withhold bronze coinage from flowing 
into their rivals’ hands as a result of cross-border trade. Their respective kingdoms – 
Southern Han, Min, Wu Yue, Southern Tang, Chu, Later Tang, Later Shu  - cast heavily-
debased, or token coinage, from lead, iron or even clay so that it could be used domestically 
to, for example, pay soldiers’ salaries. These coins were, of course, of very little intrinsic 
value, and ipso facto the first step toward ridding Chinese currency of its metallic anchorage.  
 
                                                 
2 Katō Shigeru (1959), vol. I, pp. 395-411; Twitchett (1970), pp. 72-73. 
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Toward the re-establishment of political unity in China by the Song in the 10
th – 11th 
centuries, a whole new gamut of credit instruments surfaced in other parts of China too; there 
was, for example, a private-order arrangement dubbed she 賒 whereby buyers would issue 
wholesale vendors a one-month promissory note (qiyue 契約) made payable after the resale 
of goods. The circulation of these promissory notes lent the backdrop against which Sichuan 
iron-denominated notes could take root.
3
  
 
As the Northern Song armies were consolidating their power in Sichuan at the end of the 10
th
 
century, the Later Shu 後蜀 cumbersome form of iron currency could not be adequately 
replaced with the new dynastic bronze standard mainly due to the unrealistic official 
exchange rate proclaimed by the authorities. Consequently, heavy Sichuan iron coins were 
deposited in bulk in return for promissory notes that had since been issued and regulated by 
sixteen of the wealthiest families in the region.
4
 Critically, note regulation was taken over by 
officialdom once the Song had firmly asserted its authority in the Southwest. This 
unceremonious turnaround provided the setting, in which the world’s first fiduciary paper-
money tender surfaced— but unlike today’s banknotes, pre-modern Chinese banknotes were 
inscribed vertically.
5
 
 
That sequence of events that led to the Song takeover of the private-order notes circulating in 
Sichuan (then called Yizhou 益州 ) is roundabout but critical to our understanding of 
monetary history in comparative terms. When Song administrators took over the Later Shu, 
they discovered that the kingdom’s iron coinage had by then driven out better-quality bronze 
coinage from circulation as Gresham’s Law might have predicted. Therefore, they indicated 
                                                 
3 See Katō Shigeru (1959), vol. II, pp. 1-11, 56.  
4 Elvin (1973), pp. 150-161; Schifferli (1986), passim; Cf. Peng Xinwei (1958), pp. 280-291. 
5
 Jia Daquan (1994a,b); Xu Ping’an (2000); Von Glahn (2005), pp. 67-69. 
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at first that they would introduce a gradual commutation of tax liabilities from iron coinage 
to standard bronze coinage. Yet, these intentions immediately led to a free fall in the relative 
price of iron coinage, as the local population scrambled to source bronze coinage wherever 
possible. Three years after they conquered Sichuan, Song administrators therefore decided to 
avert panic in the marketplace, and to allow for a separate currency zone in Sichuan where 
Later Shu iron coinage would continue to be admissible for tax purposes, and where 
provincial mints would continue to cast new Song coinage made of iron. Sichuan merchants 
in need of bronze coinage to purchase goods in bulk from other provinces were accordingly 
forced to exchange iron coinage at government-approved depots.
6
  
Yet, in 993, despite the Song’s willingness to accommodate heavier iron coinage, its 
plummeting exchange rate against bronze coinage unleashed a local insurgency. These 
circumstances further disrupted the mobility of iron coinage, so that some merchants started 
disbursing iron-coinage denominated bills instead. Contrary to expectation perhaps, these 
bills (jiaozi) took root over the next ten years despite frequent forgeries. In 1005, the new 
Song prefect at Chengdu, Zhang Yong 張詠 (946-1015), aimed to shore up the value of 
private-order jiaozi by limiting their issue to sixteen of the leading local merchant houses. 
Limiting issue licences was meant to help the bills gain more traction despite frequent over-
issues: tighter local-government oversight did appear to have extended the use of notes. By 
1020, however, private-order jiaozi had been rapidly depreciating again; they were not 
always honoured by the issuing houses, and consequently those houses were ordered by 
Zhang’s successor, Kou Jian 寇瑊 , to shut down much to popular protests. Indeed, China’s 
experience with paper money could have been a very short one if the newly-appointed 
Chengdu prefect, Xue Tian 薛田 , had not decided to re-instate jiaozi as a public-order 
currency in 1023, and to set up provincial exchange bureaus to administer the conversion 
                                                 
6
 Jia Daquan (1994a,b); Xu Ping’an (2000); Von Glahn (2005), pp. 67-69. 
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between jiaozi and metallic currencies for a modest commission of 3%. Furthermore, Xue 
aimed to limit each issue of notes to a three-year period and to a maximum value of 1.25 
million strings (guan), whilst requiring that the bureaus hold at all times 360,000 guan in 
metallic reserves.
7
  
 
Before long, Song administrators realised that this local Sichuan experiment in official paper 
money issuance could be expanded to the benefit of the imperial treasury. Merchants who 
were willing to carry provisions to the northern frontier, where the Song was pitted against 
Khitans and Tanguts, were often paid with various bills that were convertible to iron coinage 
or jiaozi in Sichuan and backed against state revenue from its monopoly of the local tea and 
salt trade. However, , by 1105, jiaozi notes in Sichuan were depreciating again to the extent 
they were declared void unless exchanged for government bronze-coin denominated notes 
(qianyin) at a whopping discount of 4 to 1. Soon afterwards, the costly exigencies of war 
against the invading Jurchens, who set up the Jin dynasty, led the Song to over-print qianyin 
until these became notes next to worthless too.
8
       
 
*** 
 
An expansion of the credit economy had been part and parcel of what scholars termed 
‘China’s medieval economic revolution’ during the Northern and Southern Song dynasties 
(960-1127, 1127-1279).
9
 Based in Kaifeng before the Jin onslaught of 1126, the Song 
government demonstrated unparalleled interest in economic reform. Momentous 
advancements in metallurgy, weaponry, print and maritime navigation defined much of this 
                                                 
7
 Jia Daquan (1994a,b); Xu Ping’an (2000); Von Glahn (2005), pp. 67-69. 
8
 Jia Daquan (1994a,b); Xu Ping’an (2000); Von Glahn (2005), pp. 67-69. 
 Cf. Songshi [Offical History of the Song] vol. 181 chp. 134, “Shihuoxia” 3. 
9 Elvin (1973),  pp. 164-199; Cf. Deng Gang (1999), pp. 301-324. 
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era. The velocity and quantity of both fiduciary and metallic money rose, to the extent that 
silver bullion was occasionally required as high-denomination means of payment.
10
  
 
Perhaps the most remarkable indicator for the globally-unprecedented level of monetisation 
that the Northern Song economic order ushered into China is the fact that, overall, up to 70% 
of imperial revenue at the time was levied in the form of metal or paper instruments, whereas 
in the pre-imperial era corvée labour and commodities such as grain arguably made for the 
bulk of these revenues. Such a monetised economy could not have emerged just through tax 
conversion – it went hand in hand with greater coin output, with innovations such as public-
order paper money, and arguably most importantly, with new marketplace dynamics. Around 
1077, for example, annual imperial revenue was conservatively estimated at 64.5 million 
strings of cash, of which only 36.2% was levied in the form of traditional land taxes; this is 
an impressive total compared with the makeup of Ming and Qing imperial revenue, 
considering that China was much more populous later in the imperial era. Notably, other 
sources of imperial tax revenue in 1077 came from the salt, wine and tea monopolies (34%), 
from mining activity (6.2%), and from commercial imposts (13.5%). In other words, 
commercial sources of tax adding up to more traditional sources as land taxes were becoming 
very important at the time, even if their overall share was arguably smaller than in early-
modern English fiscals. In any event, during the Southern Song era the ratio of grain to 
monetary receipts within imperial revenue was smaller still because the Southern Song lost 
much taxable arable land to the Jurchen and later to Mongol invaders.
11
  
 
                                                 
10 Quan Hansheng (1972), Vol. 1, pp. 355-416; Wang Wencheng (2000); During much of the preceding Tang 
era, payment of silver was common in the Lingnan area, but otherwise quite restricted to ceremonial purposes. It 
was very rarely levied in land tax. See Katō Shigeru (rep. 1970), vol. I, p. 47-82.  
11
 Elvin (1972), p. 149; Gao Congming (1999), pp. 16-20; Bol (2010), p. 25.  
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By way of comparison, upon the Norman occupation of England in the 11
th
 century, royal 
revenue is believed to have relied on land taxes; overall revenue totalled only around 1.7 
million pounds annually, of which as much as 64% were directed toward military outlay. The 
Normans therefore introduced a poll tax and a swag of customs and excises, which heralded a 
secular diminution in the share of land taxes of overall royal revenue. Whilst Chinese 
imperial revenue does not seem to have grown much at all after the Northern Song peak, 
English royal revenue reached 5 million pounds annually by the early 17
th
 century. Equally 
importantly, commercial taxes in England had by then made up around 70% of revenue; by 
the early 18
th
 century, interest rates in England had been considerably lower than in the 11
th
 
century, and the Crown had begun to accumulate a “national debt” both to foreign lenders 
and its own subjects through the Bank of England.
12
   
 
Elsewhere in Europe, rulers’ reliance on land taxes during the late-medieval era was arguably 
more pronounced than in Song China. Frequent warfare and a bigger military outlay, 
however, meant that European rulers scrambled to find new sources of revenue by the early-
modern era: these ranged from debasement through the sale of aristocratic degrees and 
charters to turnpikes.
13
    
 
 
*** 
 
In order to sustain the unprecedented pace of monetisation of production relations, the 
Northern Song authorities first aimed at enhancing the output of coinage. The famous 
                                                 
12
 Andreadēs (1966), pp. 54-56, 85-89, 192. Notably, Monarchist Tories had initially opposed the creation of the 
Bank of England because they believed it would advance the Republican cause. 
13
 Webber and Wildavsky (1986), pp. 262-355. Huang (1974, pp. 46-50) estimated Chinese annual imperial 
revenue in the early 16
th
 –century at only 26.7 million strings of cash, 75% of which deriving from land taxes.   
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reformer Wang Anshi 王安石 (CE 1021-1086), whom later generations of neo-Confucians 
would castigate as overly ‘statist’, in fact aimed at enlisting the private sector to ensure 
increased output of coinage would be met with sufficient amounts of raw material. To that 
end, he considerably relaxed the state’s monopoly on copper mining (tongjin 銅禁): he 
replaced forced labour with recruited miners, gave more autonomy to local pit managers, 
lifted metal price and transport controls, and reduced taxes on mineral-wealth possession 
from around 30% to only 20%, thus enticing more prospectors into the industry.
14
  
 
But demand for bronze coinage in the vast agricultural sector and in other parts of East and 
Southeast Asia put severe pressures on the state-controlled mining industry. Compounding 
the difficulty in meeting the demand for cash was the relatively high costs of maintaining 
mint hearths, as opposed to the low seigniorage revenue that the provincial authorities could 
extract form low-denomination coinage. This set of circumstances resulted in prolonged 
periods of ‘coin famine’ (qianhuang 錢荒), and may partly explain the resurgence of iron 
coinage during the Tang and Song eras.
15
 Indeed, on one end of the spectrum, the difficulty 
of obtaining cash militated scholars like Zhou Xingji 周行己(1067-1125), who supported 
supplementary paper-money issues, to deride the significance people attach to cash, as 
opposed to “grain”. Cash, he averred, “…could not be eaten in times of hunger” ( ji bu ke shi 
飢不可食).16    
 
Zhou precociously concluded that paper money could be stably and profitably maintained so 
long as the government kept two-thirds of its overall value in coin reserve, so that notes 
would be redeemed on demand. He was similarly leery of allowing too much “heavy” 
                                                 
14
 Qi Xia (1987), Vol. II, pp. 576-587; Wang Shengduo (2003), Vol. I, pp. 71-78.  
15
 Elvin (1972), pp. 147-149. 
16
 Xiao Qing (1984), 162-171. 
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fiduciary coinage (dangshiqian 當十錢) to circulate in the marketplace lest it may unleash 
inflation. In that sense, he pre-saged much of the discourse on ideal specie and bullion 
reserves to support paper money that emerged six centuries later in Europe. The European 
notion of the right reserve ratio for private-order notes also hovered between 1-2 thirds as late 
as the 19
th
 century.
17
  
 
Once Wang Anshi had acceded to a position of power next to emperor Shenzong he focused 
on increasing coin output. Wang vigorously pooled together metallurgic know-how and, as 
indicated above, provided market incentives to the extent that imperial mines and foundries 
eventually managed to double their output, extracting 9,000 tons of copper and churning out 
as many as 5 million bronze coin strings annually, i.e. 5 billion individual coins. To 
understand the sheer scale of Northern Song output, it might be useful to recall that in the late 
13
th
-century, the central London Mint is thought to have annually produced only around 50 
million silver pennies, England’s main currency at the time. Yet, even output such as Wang 
Anshi called for did not prove adequate in satiating the demand for bronze coinage, as much 
of the newly-produced coins found their way to Korea, Japan, and Southeast Asia where they 
were prized as superior media of exchange.
18
  
 
Precisely why ‘coin famines’ had come about, and how to tackle them were questions right at 
the fulcrum of statecraft debates in the 11
th
 century; it was these intense debates which 
galvanised much of the seminal neo-Confucian backlash against Wang Anshi, and account in 
                                                 
17
 
Zhang Jiaxiang  (2000), p. 19.
 
18 Hartwell (1967); Qi Xia (1987), vol. II, pp. 557-565; Von Glahn (1996), pp. 48-50. ‘Coin famine’ or 
qianhuang continued to haunt policymakers in late-Imperial China. For an illuminating description of how mid-
Qing administrators perceived of the flight of copper coins – see for example Dunstan (1996). For London Mint 
output estimates, see Craig (1953), p. 39-40, 52, 84. Whilst impressive for their time, it is worth recalling that 
according to Nef (1941, p. 581) copper produced as a by-product of silver mining in Mansfeld alone had 
reached 2,000 tons annually by the mid-16
th
 century.  
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no small measure for the fact that coinage output was ultimately much smaller in per capita 
terms during the late-imperial era. Polymath Shen Kuo 沈括 (CE 1033-1097), a Wang Anshi 
supporter, perceptively recognised that the dearth of coins was partly engendered by overseas 
demand, and partly by population growth; he suggested the best way to satiate the growing 
demand for money without further investment in mining and mints was to issue new higher-
value coins from gold and silver that would not carry a premium overseas, and to issue more 
notes to be backed by imperial revenue from the salt trade (yanchao 鹽鈔).19  
 
A few opponents of Wang Anshi at the court also recognised overseas demand as an 
important contributor to the ‘famine’ but nevertheless blamed Wang’s relaxation of the 
state’s copper monopoly as making the haemorrhage of coins possible. For Sima Guang, 
Wang’s neo-Confucian arch-rival, there was nonetheless only one folly at heart, namely, the 
thrust toward greater monetisation of the rural economy, which disrupted in his view time-
honored production relations, and made commodities dearer.
20
    
 
Coin famines remained a pernicious problem right until the 14
th
 century, as Wang’s supply-
side solutions lost favour. In the subsequent Southern Song era, there was greater reliance on 
large fiduciary coinage (daqian), on paper instruments, and on iron coinage (well beyond 
Sichuan), to a large extent as a result of the Northern Song government’s failure at ensuring 
that enough full-bodied bronze coinage would remain in circulation locally so that the 
monetisation of the tax base could be balanced off. Yet, the proliferation of paper instruments 
was not limited to state-backed scrip: private-order scrip and commodity bills of exchange 
continued to be widespread too. Later, the dearth of “cash” led both the Southern Song 
officialdom and some merchants to try disbursing shorter strings of cash (duanmo 短陌), 
                                                 
19
 Xiao Qing (1984), pp. 154-162. 
20
 Xiao Qing (1984), pp. 148-154. 
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containing around 80 coins, at the same nominal value of a guan sub-string (mo 陌)ordinarily 
containing 100 coins.
21
  
 
Historically, the Song formalisation of “short” strings is an important juncture because the 
conceptualisation of 1,000 full-bodied bronze coins on par with a “string” was not only an 
ideal that later dynasties pursued; this parity may have evolved from the ancient custom of 
stringing cowrie in early-imperial times. That 1:1,000 parity was mentioned as early as the 
Western Han era in Sima Qian’s famous Records of the Grand Historian. Smaller strings 
could be found in the marketplace during the Tang era, perhaps as a consequence of similar 
cash dearth, but they were not openly formalised by the state in the same way.
22
   
 
More to the point, the definitive defeat of Wang Anshi’s policies upon the ascent to the 
throne of Emperor Huizong (r. 1100-1126) set in train a secular decline in coin output; it also 
begot an enduring statecraft legacy in that the economic latitude of the state, e.g. its ability to 
partake of private enterprise, was constrained, whilst the semblance of all-powerful emperors 
was preserved. But it was not just economic policy that turned around: the fact that Wang 
Anshi’s fairly short-lived pro-commerce measures had not of themselves translated into a 
stronger imperial army that might have conceivably fended off the invasions of steppe 
peoples from the north tended to unfairly becloud his legacy in the eyes of future generation 
of imperial policy-makers.
23
  
 
*** 
                                                 
21
 Elvin (1973), p. 147; Xiao Qing (1984), pp. 148-154; Wang Shengduo (2003), vol. 1, pp. 137-171, 300-303, 
354-386. On duanmo see also Hartwell (1967), pp. 280-289; Von Glahn (1996), pp. 21-23; Von Glahn (2005), 
pp. 65-69. 
22
 Shiji 30, “Pingzhunshu” 8.  
23
 Qi Xia (1987), vol. II, pp. 576-587.  The unseemly neo-Confucian vein of casting emperors as the“omnipotent 
rubber-stamps” of their righteous officials might in fact derive from pre-imperial thought, as Pines (2009, pp. 
82-113) suggests. Cf. Bol (2010), Introduction.    
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Throughout the Northern Song era, bronze coinage was the standard except for Sichuan 
where it was initially the mainstay of the money stock, whereby 10 iron coins were nominally 
made convertible to 1 standard bronze coin.  In other parts of China, Song iron coinage – to 
the extent it was current there – served merely as “token” or subsidiary money. However, the 
value of iron coinage depreciated precipitously, so that much of it flowed back to Sichuan, 
where the authorities effectively discouraged the use of bronze coinage.
24
  
 
Sichuan iron coinage predated the establishment of the Song, but it was the Song dynasty’s 
attempt to regulate the private issue of iron coin-denominated notes in Sichuan that heralded 
the evolution of paper money into an acceptable, large scale and state-backed medium of 
payment. Before 1073, the perception of full convertibility of state-backed notes to coin was 
quite sound, but over time the Song geared its bureaucracy toward issuing notes against tax 
payment in coin rather than handing over coins to individuals in return for its own notes 
(naqian qingjiao 納錢請交). Since pre-modern paper as a raw material eroded quickly, the 
Northern Song could also find a pretext to limit the validity of each of its issues to only a few 
years (jie 界), quite apart from the geographical constraints it imposed on where some of the 
issue could circulate. On expiry, the notes then had to be exchanged at a considerable 
discount for a new issue, a stratagem later used by the Yuan and Ming treasuries too. 
Notably, as of 1073, because of the mounting fiscal pressures of maintaining peace with the 
steppe peoples to its north, the Song government started issuing unbacked jiaozi, i.e. notes 
that were disbursed without any commensurate amount of coinage received by the treasury. 
However, even prior to 1073, the use paper of instruments was not always tied to coinage 
receipts: since the Song government constantly needed merchants to convey supplies to 
                                                 
24
 Gao Congming (1999), pp. 43-44. 
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garrisons in the northwest, that region ran a trade deficit with the rest of China. Hence, in 
return for their services, merchants who made the journey west from the economic heartland 
of China in the east were often paid not in coin but in exemption bills that could reduce their 
tax liability in their home province, or in certificates that allowed them to partake of the 
heavily government-regulated salt trade.
25
  
 
Shen Kuo’s suggestion for silver coinage notes to be issued as a means of meeting the 
demands of monetisation across the Northern Song society, and of defraying the costs of a 
growing state apparatus, is critical precisely because it was not acted on; instead, where 
medieval rulers might have resorted to silver or gold coin debasement elsewhere in Eurasia, 
Song governments resorted to paper money in the main. 
 
Clearly, then, one of the most intriguing facets of Song paper money is its regional private-
order provenance, as was the case in Europe too. Private-order paper instruments would 
generally indicate the growth of a credit economy quite apart from the monetization of tax 
base. Yet it was only with state take-over that the same paper money could become current 
beyond the locality where it had been issued. Progressively, state-issued notes had been 
losing their metallic anchorage: the main form of paper money in the Southern Song for 
example (huizi 會子) was more fiduciary in nature than jiaozi or qianyin if only due to the 
fact that the coinage with which it was denominated had been produced much less than in the 
Northern Song era. Bronze coin-denominated qianyin had been circulating at a discount 
during the Northern Song era, yet they were still fairly sought after by merchants – perhaps it 
was this experience that led Southern Song officialdom to conclude that huizi would not need 
to be fully-convertible on demand. In that sense, the transition from the Northern to Southern 
                                                 
25
 Gao Congming (1999), pp. 50-66. 
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Song might betoken the first few steps toward annunciating fiat currency in practise, although 
at the conceptual level, the link between paper money and metal was never fully severed in 
pre-modern China.
26
  
 
By the same token, that the Song increasingly resorted to unbacked notes, and to iron coinage 
-- not just in Sichuan but throughout the Huainan region -- as its armies retreated south might 
have cemented a trope in later Chinese statecraft subtly linking fiat-money leanings with an 
fin-de-siècle or dynastic decline (衰叔  shuaishu). 27   Following Zhou Xingji, however, 
references to specific reserve requirements became rare in statecraft discourse, even though 
reserve principles remained well understood. Yuan Xie 袁燮 (1144-1224) of the Southern 
Song era was perhaps one of the most representative voices of that discursive vein when he 
postulated: “paper notes are a matter that will be of lowly esteem when aplenty, and become 
prized when scarce; thus redeeming some of them out of circulation, will make them 
appreciate in value; for when it is lowly its circulation languishes; when it is prized, it will be 
widely used; thus redeeming some of it will boost its circulation.
28
    
  
 
*** 
 
The Northern Song move away from solid reserve holdings seem to have come around 1127, 
as the Song armies retreated south in the face of Tangut (Xixia) and later Jurchen (Jin) 
                                                 
26
 Von Glahn (2005), p. 75.  
27
 See e.g. Ye Ziqi’s 葉子奇(CE1327-1390) observation  in his Caomuzi 草木子 vol. 3b Zazhi 雜制: “當其盛
時皆用鈔以權錢. 及當衰叔，財貨不足，止廣造楮幣以為費” [When the Song and Yuan were in their 
golden age, they both used paper money to support bronze coinage. But once in decline, and as material goods 
and metallic money became scarcer , they increasingly resorted to paper money for imperial outlay]. Notably, 
Ye was not against paper money in principle; he supported the early-Ming issue, but suggested sound metallic 
reserves must be kept. 
28
 The original passage is cited by Xiao Qing (1984, pp. 248-257) as: “楮之為物也﹐ 多則賤﹐ 少則貴﹐ 收之
則貴矣﹔賤則壅﹐貴則通﹐收之則通矣” 
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invasions. Now based in Hangzhou, the Southern Song bureaucracy was bifurcated by 
spiralling military expenditure. Hawkish officials were calling to recover China’s territorial 
integrity, while doves sought to maintain the status-quo with the nomadic peoples of the 
northern steppe lands and avoid a fiscal nemesis. In 1135, the Court had tried to introduce 
inconvertible notes in frontier areas only in order to strike a balance between the two camps. 
However, the new notes were rejected by merchants and provincial administrators to the 
effect that by 1160 convertibility to specie had to be restored.
29
  
 
Steppe peoples who posed constant threat to the Song were, at the same time, imitating Song 
institutions and material culture, and incorporating more and more ethnic-Chinese sedentary 
communities within their midst. But the pattern of imitation was not identical at least insofar 
as coinage design was concerned. For example, the Mongols, who eventually annihilated the 
Song, had occasionally inscribed their bronze coins with ‘Phags-pa script. By comparison, 
the Jurchen Jin Dynasty exclusively used Chinese script on its coinage. In 1157, the Jin also 
printed “Song-style” paper money denominated in bronze coinage units for the first time. 
This was followed in 1197 with silver-denominated Jin notes. But little is known about the 
degree to which the Jin applied metallic reserve principles to their banknotes.
30
  
 
What is known about the Jin-Southern Song fray in monetary terms is that it resembled in no 
small measure the proto-mercantilist setting of the Five Dynasties era: each side tried to use 
fiduciary notes as a way of preventing copper from flowing in the other direction, but the 
dearth of bronze coinage made both Jin and Southern Song paper money lose value rapidly. 
In response, the Jin introduced baser iron coinage and tried to revitalise mining by relaxing its 
government monopoly on mining and foundries, much like the Northern Song had attempted 
                                                 
29 Qi Xia (1987), vol. II, pp. 1188-1194; Von Glahn (1996), pp. 51-56. 
30
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earlier. Jin paper money finally came undone in 1206, as the Mongols were consolidating 
their power in the north, and pushing into Jurchen occupied territory. The cost of Jin defences 
against the Mongols was financed by printing more and more paper money, whilst at the 
same time forcing commoners to render their tax liability in hard currency. Soon afterwards, 
Jin paper money became effectively worthless. Yet in some ways it informed the Mongol 
monetary experience: both Jin and Yuan paper moneys for example bore greater relation to 
silver than Song paper money, which had been denominated in bronze and iron units.
31
 
3. The Early European Experience with Paper Money in Comparison 
Perhaps the most compelling difference between the Chinese pre-modern experience with 
paper money issuance and that which typified early-modern Europe was the fact that the 
latter served as a gateway to the modern “national debt” economy. Chinese emperors, by 
comparison, issued banknotes but did not quite borrow from the public, or from foreign 
merchants, before the 19
th
 century. To be sure, positions in the bureaucracy, honorific titles or 
certificates allowing private individuals to partake of the state’s monopolised industries like 
salt, liquor and mining were occasionally sold so as to supplement imperial revenue. For 
example, Song-era merchants who were willing to carry provisions to the northern frontier 
were quite often paid with salt certificates called yanyin (鹽引). These certificates allowed 
the merchants, in turn, to purchase salt in government-run wells, and on-sell it elsewhere. 
Proceeds from the sale of such certificates became increasingly important once the mid-Ming 
polity was forced to abandon banknote issuance in the mid-15
th
 century. During the early 16
th
 
century, a large secondary market for yanyin rights (kaizhong 開中法) emerged around 
Huizhou: at that time these certificates characterised by a fairly high degree of fungibility. 
However, by 1617 the kaizhong market was undermined by the Ming bureaucracy, which 
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decided to fairly arbitrarily concentrate slat-trade right in hands of a handful of favoured 
merchants. As a result, yanyin circulation volumes shrank, and the revenue therefrom never 
quite supplanted the bulk of Ming imperial receipts, which remained grounded in land tax.
 32
    
 
Patterns associated with the rise of England’s “national economy” are quite telling in this 
context. Between the late 17
th
 century to mid-18
th
 century, English national debt grew from 
meagre 2 million pounds to a whopping 834 million. Whilst late-medieval and early-modern 
English monarchs frequently borrowed from foreign merchant families like the Lombards, by 
19
th
 century the English “nationa debt” was mainly owed impersonally to domestic 
bondholders. Indirect commercial tax revenue at that time – such as farmed-out custom 
receipts -- contributed around 70% of all English tax revenue.
33
 Indeed, this might explain 
perhaps why, short of showing much interest in Qing land-tax revenue -- one of the first thing 
British empire-builders sought to establish when they set foot on Shanghai’s shore in 1842 
was a “Chinese” Imperial Maritime Customs. 
If the eighteenth-century was for Ming China one of reliance on imported silver, it presaged 
in Britain both materially and culturally a transition into paper money and nation-statehood. 
The radiation of paper money from Britain to Continental Europe in the eighteenth century 
was one expression of an emergent credit economy, equity markets and corporate ownership. 
Sandra Sherman, for example, contended that “…long-term credit implicated [British] culture 
in a new kind of narrativity, since promises in stock annuities, and negotiable [paper] 
instruments were verifiable only with time.”34  
Notably, as England itself was switching to paper money use domestically, it relied on 
Spanish-American dollars in farther-flung parts of its trading empire. From 1497, the Spanish 
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colonial government minted a large silver coin which through wide circulation became 
known as the Spanish silver dollar. Around the end of the 18th century, this coin was in wide 
circulation in the West Indies, Eastern Canada and the United States. The value of the coin 
varied in different locales but was highest in Halifax, capital of the Canadian Province of 
Nova Scotia. Consequently, whenever merchants from the adjacent Province of Prince 
Edward Island secured Spanish dollars, they sent them to Halifax, to take advantage of the 
higher exchange rate there. The resulting shortage of money in on the Island itself prompted 
the governor to gather in all the Spanish dollars he could and have their centres punched out 
and counter-stamped with a sunburst. The punched centres passed as shillings and the outer 
rims as five-shilling pieces. The mutilated coins were thereafter no longer acceptable outside 
of Prince Edward Island, so as a consequence, turned into discrete provincial currency.
35
  
The US Congress established relation among the US dollar and other foreign coins that 
circulated widely in the country in 1793, but only the Spanish silver dollar was considered 
legal tender and equated to the US dollar, although its silver content differed slightly. This 
special status for the Spanish dollar in the US was due to its ubiquity. After the 
decolonisation of Latin-America, Mexican silver dollars appear to have become the chief 
metallic money used in southern American states topping the US dollar itself; Mexican 
dollars were also the most popular money in the American West as late as 1849.
36
 
The historic transition from metal to paper money in Europe was thus relatively slow. The 
recovery of mints during the Carolingian era after a protracted post-Roman hiatus paved the 
way for a significant increase in continental trade. Concomitantly, the emergence of 
Florentine banking in the 12
th
 century dispelled many of the papal interdictions on interest 
and capital accumulation. Widening trade links then provided the impetus for a distinctly 
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European phenomenon: the rise of joint-stock enterprise.
37
 Joint-stock companies were 
emerging alongside guilds in Europe from the sixteenth- century. Many had received a Royal 
Charter, which helped them monopolise the most lucrative commodities in foreign trade. At 
the same time, the transferability and scope of share ownership consolidated the companies’ 
purchasing power and institutionalised their independence from the sovereign. Politically, 
this new balance of power was reflected in, for example, the way the British Parliament was 
displacing the Crown as the key agent of fiscal policy, and in the legalistic articulation of 
private property rights. 
Whist commonalities between the mid-Ming and Tudor economies across both extremes of 
Eurasia may be hard to pin down, there is some similarity between  the Sichuan setting, in 
which the world’s first paper money had emerged, and that of Sweden, a peripheral European 
economy where banknotes were first used in the West. Much like iron-abundant late 10
th
-
century Sichuan, Sweden was a net exporter of raw metal (copper) in the mid-17
th
-century. 
Notably, in both instances paper money first emerged as private-order mechanism designed 
to facilitate the settling of accounts within monetary systems grounded in heavier coinage 
that the one used in surrounding regions: iron coinage in Sichuan, copper coinage in Sweden. 
Notable too is the fact that Sweden was a late comer into the nascent western-European 
“national debt” economic mould; though it furnished much of the iron and copper that 
sustained Portuguese, Dutch and English trade with Africa at the time, it was not the driving 
force behind that inter-continental trade. In fact, the Swedish National Debt Office was only 
set up only in 1789 in order to help fund warfare with Russia.
38
 
Furthermore, in both instances, private-order note values started depreciating dramatically a 
few years after they were issued, and were only stabilised once the state took over their 
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issuance. In 1656 a Dutch merchant by the name of Johan Palmstruch, who became Chair of 
the fledgling Swedish Board of Trade,  may have realised the potential profits he could make 
by helping Swedish merchants avoid the necessity of carrying cumbersome copper coinage; 
he repeatedly petitioned the Swedish throne to advance the establishment of banks in the 
kingdom, and eventually received a royal charter that year to set up a private bank 
(Stockholms Banco) in return for committing half of the profits to the Crown. In 1661, that 
bank started granting loans against property collateral, as well as disbursing notes 
(kreditivsedlar) to clients for a commission, and against commensurate non-yielding deposits 
of copper coinage. In the beginning, these private-order notes proved immensely popular to 
the extent that they circulated at a premium over metallic money. Palmstruch, however, could 
not resist the temptation of surfeit issues over and above the bank’s receipts in metal. When 
the public noticed that, a serious run on Stockholms Banco ensued, leading to the latter’s 
collapse in 1668 and to Palmstruch’s imprisonment on embezzlement charges. The Swedish 
government was subsequently forced to intervene in order to allay the anger of  Palmstruch’s 
depositors and note bearers; from then on, the Swedish government took over banknote 
issuance, initially as a public good, and only much later as a form of national debt.
 39
  
A Swedish parliamentary central bank (Riksbank) was set up to replace Stockholms Banco, 
and deal with the trail of disgruntled debtors it left behind.   By 1701, Riksbank started to 
issue certified cheques of its own, which circulated as paper money side by side with specie. 
So much so that much copper coinage was drawn out of circulation, and Sweden went on an 
effectively inconvertible paper money standard in 1745. After Sweden’s entry into the Seven-
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Year war in 1756, it experienced severe budget deficits and inflation to the extent that bulky 
copper coinage could circulate at a great premium against Riksbank notes.
40
  
 
But, as indicated above, the linkage between banknote issuance and the rise in impersonal 
public debt occurred much later in Sweden than in England. In 1789, the National Debt 
Office (Riksgäldskontoret) issued for the first time large quantities of small-denomination 
interest-bearing promissory notes, which circulated simultaneously with the Riksbank notes 
for forty years. Then, in 1831, a year after Sweden formally switched back to a silver 
standard, Enskilda (private) banks began to issue notes that circulated side by side with the 
Riksbank notes for another seventy years. Besides these more officially sanctioned notes, the 
early-modern Swedish money supply also consisted of a mixture of notes issued by a variety 
of organizations and individuals – only a fraction of these notes were redeemable in silver 
however. Swedish monetary “exceptionalism” formally ended in 1873, as it joined the 
British-led gold standard.
41
 The country further converged with the rest of Western Europe in 
1897, as private bank note issuance rights were abolished. This was a significant milestone 
not least because, unlike England, private banking in Sweden had revolved right until the 
1860s around currency exchange and note issuance rather the provision of industrial or 
mercantile credit.
 42
     
As indicated above, the great bulk of coinage in 17
th
-century Sweden was made of copper, 
whilst Tudor coinage had been based on silver and gold. In order to raise the global price of 
copper, one of Sweden’s main exports at the time, King Gustavus Adolphus (r. 1611-1632) 
decided to place the Swedish monetary system on a copper standard, which lasted right until 
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1776. The increase in Swedish copper exports dovetailed with growing demand for copper in 
Hapsburg Spain, which also aimed to debase its domestic coinage, whilst diverting silver and 
gold from its colonies in Latin America to be sold as raw material for currency in other parts 
of the world.  On that score, at least, Sichuan in the Five Dynasties era appears somewhat 
removed from the European setting in question because iron coinage was initially used there 
by the Later Shu as a mercantilist stratagem of preventing more-precious copper form 
crossing the border into competing kingdoms against the backdrop of coin “dearth” 
(qianhuang), whilst Spain adopted baser-metal coinage to actually facilitate the outflow of 
more-precious metal overseas during an era which saw the output of precious metal spike up. 
Yet when 17
th
-century Sweden is compared directly with 17
th
-century East Asia rather than 
with the Later Shu, other revealing points of convergence emerge: it is interesting for 
example that in Sweden, too, copper mines were mostly state-run (there was, however, more 
private enterprise in the Swedish iron industry). Also of note is that whilst Swedish copper 
underpinned Spain’s new domestic currency, 17th-century Japanese copper furnished Chinese 
and Indian imperial mints. That Japanese copper could not, on the other hand, substantively 
compete with Swedish copper in European markets attest to the limited scope of globalisation 
before the age of steam.
43
            
*** 
 
Largely driven by the Bank of England (est. 1694), the spread of banknotes in Britain during 
the 18
th
-century followed rather different dynamics than in Sweden. Baldly put, paper note 
issuance seems to have been associated with the rise of a modern credit economy more 
inchoately, when compared with England. To begin with, one has to recall that the Bank of 
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England had first been set up as a manger of Crown debt, evolving into a singular bank of 
issue only much later. It aimed at expanding its own note issue at the expense of a multitude 
of other private-bank issued notes in the 18
th
 century, but its monopoly of paper money in 
England was formalized only in 1844. Elsewhere in Continental Europe and Scotland, private 
banknotes proliferated well into the late 19
th
 century. In Scotland and Hong Kong private 
banknote issuance survived to this day.
44
  
How did private bank notes emerge in England in the latter part of the 17
th
 century, not long 
after Palmstruch introduced this innovation in Sweden ? The advanced Dutch credit economy 
may have facilitated the introduction of the idea on the British Isles: it was perhaps no 
accident that Palmstruch himself had grown up in the Netherlands, where mercantile bills of 
exchange had long been in use, and where the Bank of Amsterdam (Amsterdamsche 
Wisselbank, est. 1609) was renowned for its intricate conversion system between silver and 
gold, and for its prowess in invoicing customer deposits in a multitude of foreign coins of 
varying quality. Those invoices could eventually be bought and sold in the marketplace for 
hard currency by those preferring the safety of the Bank’s assay system and full metallic 
reserves. A few decades later, the Bank of Amsterdam also became important creditor to the 
Dutch East India Company (VOC) and the municipality of Amsterdam, yet in its formative 
stages it abstained from credit provision that might have detracted from its bullion holdings.
45
     
In the early 17
th
-century, English long-distance merchants had not yet had a comparable 
exchange bank to turn to. Rather, wealthy merchants often deposited their excess gold or 
silver at the London Tower Mint for safekeeping. This habit came to an abrupt end in 1640, 
when Charles I expropriated Tower Mint private deposits to defray the cost of his campaigns 
against the English and Scottish parliamentary armies. Disillusioned, more and more of  the 
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city’s merchants began to deposit their excess specie from then on with London’s goldsmiths 
on Lombard Street. The latter would pay 5% interest on such deposits, and would issue 
written receipts as proof of the amount brought in. Some of the specie deposited would be on-
lent by the goldsmiths at a higher interest rate, whilst the receipts themselves started to pass 
from hand to hand until they evolved into impersonal scrip in effect. That scrip pattern was 
then emulated by small regional banks outside London in the later part of the 17
th
 century, 
and it was these “country banks” that made for the incipient circulation of paper money 
(“cheques”) on the British Isles before the establishment of the Bank of England. 46      
 
Then, the popularization of notes in the West gathered much more momentum when improved 
printing technology had finally managed to keep forgeries at bay. During the early 1800s, 
Philadelphia inventor Jacob Perkins’s steel plates and siderography began to change the world 
of note printing. By the 1860s, note printing in Britain and the United States had been 
mechanized and the need to manually date notes all but eliminated. Printers such as the 
London-based Bradbury, Wilkinson & Co., the American Banknote Company, and the 
Continental Bank Note Company of New York made use of these new applications to become 
premium suppliers of notes to the rest of the world— China and Japan included.47 
 
More generally, the nascent modern credit economy was advanced in no small measure 
thanks to an invigorated concept of corporate ownership. The latter evolved following the 
Renaissance as a means of affirming the concession of property rights by the monarch, the 
Bank of England included. The monarch tolerated the concept of corporate ownership 
because the first joint-stock trading companies paid for their Charters, and helped raise tax 
revenue. Through the share capital they raised, the founders of joint-stock companies 
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achieved a degree of investment security and economies of scale that were quite unparalleled 
elsewhere in the early-modern world. By the early nineteenth century, the British Parliament 
was not only tolerating joint-stock enterprise but also actively engaged in regulating it, and 
laying down the legal wherewithal for its exponential growth in the twentieth century.
48
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
The last millennium saw triumphal bouts, decline and resurgence of paper money in China 
and the West. The world’s first paper money owes its rise to monetary innovation as early as 
the Tang dynasty. These came of age during the Northern Song, and culminated in the Yuan 
dynasty’s de-facto renunciation of coinage. However, the Chinese pre-modern experiment 
with paper money was not an enduring one. In the mid-15
th
 century, the Ming polity was 
forced to relinquish paper money, and the Chinese economy became wholly dependent 
therefrom on imported silver as the main medium of exchange. While bronze coinage 
conceptually remained the anchor of late-imperial monetary thought because of its 
importance to the peasantry, standardized silver bullion, largely measured by weight and 
quality rather than by tale, was in practice the currency used in higher-denomination 
transactions. Ironically, it was not until the establishment of British banks in Shanghai in the 
latter half of the 19
th
 century that paper money would re-emerged in China on a large scale.    
  
What hypotheses could this overview support ? First it would suggest that extensive 
monetary use of silver or gold was not a prerequisite for paper money proliferation. To the 
contrary, in both the Sichuan and Swedish experience, the appearance of paper money was 
strongly associated with the use of base metals, and private-order mercantile initiative. At the 
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same time, when viewed comparatively, the European and Chinese experiences suggest that 
sustaining paper money involved sooner or later prompt central-authority intervention. Far 
from enshrining note convertibility, whether the pre-modern state would be able to entrench 
fiduciary or token currency might be inferred ex post from its ability to project metallic-
reserve inviolability and prudence as to how it pursued debasement. Though crucial at first, 
private bank note issuance would become peripheral across pre-modern Eurasia. Once the 
state had taken over bank note issuance, and was able to prop up circulation for some time, it 
would ultimately seek to borrow against future earnings rather than against its present bullion 
holdings. In that sense, the reliability of state-backed notes ineffably underlay the state’s 
ability to later disseminate other paper-based debt instruments like salt certificates, corporate 
charters or bonds.       
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